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Abstract 
 
Assembly line information systems are designed to provide assembly workers 
with appropriate information that allows the assembly of the product in good 
time and good quality. In this context product quality might be defined relative 
to the number of internal rejects or products which need some kind of 
reworking before being in a deliverable condition. 
 
This paper describes a pilot study of a heavy diesel engine assembly line where 
considerable variety is presented to the assembly workers in the form of engines 
destined for trucks, buses, marine applications and stationary power generation 
each of which has to comply with a variety of national and international  
standards. Internal rejects might for example occur through the fitting of sub-
assemblies that are unsuited to the eventual application, and although an 
extensive information system is currently in place the level of internal rejects is 
considered to be unsatisfactory. The objectives of the study were to understand 
how the assembly workers interact with information systems and the impact this 
has on product quality and productivity. A single line was studied for ten days 
during which 2600 engines were assembled. At four of the assembly stations the 
existing information system was changed to reduce the amount of information to 
be assimilated by the workers, the timing of its presentation and its location. 
The use of simple colour-coded cards and symbols resulted in the reduction of 
internal rejects by 40% on two of the assembly stations and to zero on the other 
two stations. It is believed that changing the information system has changed the 
workers' behaviour through a reduction in cognitive stress levels. The pilot 
study  has  provided  useful  insights into  the basis for  modifying information 
systems and a further study of the final assembly of  heavy trucks  is  planned with 
an ultimate aim of determining a rationale for the design of information systems for 
use within the assembly of   customised products. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Volvo Powertrain in Skovde, Sweden manufactures heavy diesel engines destined for trucks, buses, marine 
applications and stationary power generation each of which has to comply with a variety of national and 
international standards. Engines are assembled using mixed-model production where a high volume product is 
assembled in the main flow but low volume products are also present. To handle this situation a dynamic 
information system is essential so that it can (for example) refer to parts to be assembled on a specific engine, 
information regarding how to assemble a particular engine, etc. In the plant studied the information system is 
implemented as an IT system mounted on the automatic guided vehicles (AGVs) that carry  the engines down  the 
assembly line. Earlier work [I] explored the relationships between  attention,  interpretation,  decision-making and 
acting and how this relates to the information flow based on the idea [2] that the degree to which Active 
Information Seeking behaviour is supported/triggered has a large influence on the number of internal rejects. As 
an extreme example, if a trigger is not present or detected, then an active information seeking behaviour will not 
be present. In  other words, the trigger is predecessor to active attention, and active attention is believed to be a 
state of mind that is crucial for successful use of data and information. If it is not possible to create attention, then 
it is not possible to start an interpretation,  decision-making  and  acting  process.  Obviously, there will still be 
some kind of interpretation, decision-making and acting, and the  assembly  personnel will continue to assemble 
engines, but the risk of assembly errors increases if one fails to trigger the personnels' attention [3] at the right 
time and to the correct data source. "Structured translation of data into  action" [4] to reach a specific goal must 
be the main focus for the assembly personnel. This requires that the information is available at the right time in 
the right place and  that  the assembly  personnel  have identified  a need for the specific information. In the 
assembly environment there is evidence, internal rejects, that  the personnel do not use the information system in 
the most effective way. Studies made on the shop floor have concluded that the support system, from a graphical 
point-of-view is well, but not perfectly designed, but the users do not use them in a way that was anticipated. 
Input from ongoing projects indicates that one the main reasons for this is the attention levels among the 
assembly personnel. 
 
 
1.1 The Role of Information Triggers 
 
The purpose of any rational action  should  be to achieve a goal  [5, 6]. This should  normally  create a demand 
for information, which is triggered in some way. There are four situations regarding information need versus 
demand: (I) There is a need but no demand. An error will eventually occur,  and  a  solution  might  be  to 
introduce triggers to create the demand. (ii) There is a need and a demand. This situation  is the preferred one  
with low risk of errors due to lack of information . It is still essential that information matches the need. (iii)  
There is a demand but no need. This situation can be frustrating for the personnel  as they  have identified  a  
need and have a demand, but they are not provided with the information they feel they need. (iv) There is no  
need and no demand. 
  
 
1.2 Models Relating Action to  Information 
 
The OODA loop (Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action) [7] is an example of a model relating the 
information process to actions. However, some researchers [8] have suggested  that "Observe,  Orient, Decide  
and Act" should be redefined to "Observe, Interpret, Decide and  Act".  This  would  create  a  more  generic 
model more suitable for manufacturing purposes, and in this case make it possible to map "Attention, 
Interpreting, Decision making and Acting" to the OODA model in a better way. 
 
 
1.3 Attention 
 
Before it is possible to receive information, one must perceive its presence. Aspects of passive and active 
attention are believed to be major contributors to problems in the work environment [2, 9-11]. Active attention   
is connected to actively processing information. e.g. during skilled  machining  operations  one actively  seeks  
and processes information. In passive attention, such as a visual inspection  task  we  may  register 
data/information in our surroundings without processing it actively until something unusual happens . The 
assembly personnel studied seem to be aware of some data, and  perform  parts of  tasks correctly,  but at  the 
same time missed other important  issues connected  to the same task, although all data/information is available  
in the context of the work station. In other words,  attention  plays an important role in how data is observed. 
 
 
1.4 Interpreting 
 
In this case "interpreting" refers to the process of transforming [12] data into information. One way to describe 
the difference between data and information is that data is "a set of symbols in which the individual symbols 
have a potential for meaning but may not be meaningful to a given recipient" or "a set of symbols in which the 
individual symbols are known, but the combination is meaningless " or "understandable symbols rejected by 
the recipient as being of no interest or value" [12]. Information however can be described as "a message that 
exists but that is not necessarily sent to, or received by, a given recipient" or "a message sent to a destination 
or received by a destination, but not evaluated or understood" or "a message understood by the recipient and 
which changes that person's knowledge base" or "an output of the process of converting received messages, 
data, signs, or signals into knowledge." [12]. This leads to a conclusion that there is a connection between 
interpretation, data and information. The definition of information [12] states that it is an output of a process. 
This output among other things, such as knowledge, is a base for decision-making and acting. From this it is 
possible to state that information in the assembly plant context could be a message that when received , read, 
interpreted by a recipient creates knowledge/changes the receiver's knowledge base so that an action can be 
committed by the receiver that is predicted by the sender. 
 
 
1.5 Decision-making and Acting 
 
Although the subject of linking acting to decision making is an interesting topic,  within  the context of this  
paper these two topics can be discussed as one. Decision-making can be seen from a process perspective as a 
"many-to-one  mapping  of information  to responses" [13]. If  one considers this visualization  together  with the 
  
 
"mapping" statement it is easy to see that ·there could be different data/information sources that provide 
assembly personnel with data/information. This of course can directly affect the decision-making process in a 
negative way. 
 
 
1.6 The Importance of Triggers 
 
A trigger is the signal that creates a change of state regarding attention, from passive to active, and preferably, 
from active to passive. The hypothesis is that on the shop floor much of the  attention  is focused  on  the 
assembly task, and not on gathering data/information. This selective attention [14] is a  part  of  the human  
nature, so an information system should provide a possibility to focus the assembler's  attention  to the right  
place (there is evidence that at the specific plant, the personnel use data/information from non-reliable sources) 
and at the right time as the trigger and the data must be synchronised.. The information system should support     
a change of state between active and passive. As "it is the nature of the attention process to generate its own 
extinction" [15], a trigger must also contribute to the "resurrection" of the information demand. It is important  
that a trigger is used in a way that really supports the  personnel.  There is evidence  at plant  that misuse  of 
quality support systems have created a feeling of irritation leading to  misuse. 
 
 
2.0 Pilot Study 
 
The aim of the pilot study is to find evidence that supports the overall aim of the research which is to find or 
develop a prototype work method that supports the design of information flow based on product and process 
demands. Two hypotheses have been formulated: Hypothesis 1  -  'Information  Seeking  Behaviour'  -  The  
degree to which Active Information Seeking behaviour is supported/triggered has a large  influence  on the 
number of internal  rejects.  Hypothesis  2 -  'use of evaluation  methods'  The use of an evaluation  work method 
in the conceptual as well as in the design phase of an information flow will affect the  internal  rejects in a 
positive way. The pilot study was aimed at gaining practical knowledge  regarding  how  triggers,  active  
attention and passive attention affect the internal reject rate, but it also gave knowledge regarding how the 
assembly personnel interact with the information flow· present in their work context. It is hoped that the 
knowledge gained from the pilot will be useful in the next stage of the research which is the creation of a 
prototype work method. 
 
 
2.1 Performance Indicator 
 
To evaluate the value of the knowledge  obtained  it is important  to  identify a performance  indicator. In  this  
case the main performance indicator is the rate of internal rejects for which there is historic data. The historic 
data covers a period of about 9 months in 2006 and includes approximately 33000 records. This data includes: 
date and time which can be used to trace the error source, engine family and variant (the data includes data 
connected to 6, 7, 12, 13 and 16 litre engines). The engine families have different variants (known as "engine 
types") and approximately 500 variants exist), effect number (a code used for reject causes),  part number and  
free text field (used to describe the cause of rejection - unfortunately not used reliably). The reject historic data 
process starts with a discovery of a divergence from the order specification . This is done at the end of the line 
  
 
and in the test zones. If a divergence is discovered it is saved in a database and problem is solved in a special 
reject area. The most common way of subsequently retrieving data from the database is via a Business Objects 
(BO) question. This data has to be prepared for viewing so that the reject information can be used as the basis 
of decision-making. In this case the data can be sorted to identify the engine family, the date and time (to 
establish a weekly reject rate) and the assembly station. 
 
 
2.2 Experimental Assembly Environment 
 
The actual production environment under norrnal operating conditions was used in the pilot study and was 
modified by changing the trigger from· the screen-based alphanumeric approach. The new triggers  were  
coloured magnetic rubber sheets attached to the Automatic Guided Vehicle (AGV) which is the carrier of the 
engine (figure  I). The sheets have five different colours - blue, pink, orange, green and black to act as triggers  
for the different situations.  
Fig. l.       The AGV/carrier and its cargo, a diesel  engine. 
 
 
2.3 Quantitative Data 
 
The results were evaluated by comparing the performance indicator before and after the pilot study. As 
mentioned  earlier,  this indicator is a part of the reject handling  system and  had  previously  been  measured for 
  
 
approximately 9 months during 2006. The data gathered during the pilot study shows that the performance 
indicator for the period is at a mean level of 1.46% (figure 2). However, depending on the sorting·of the reject 
data two more values with higher means of 2.77% and 3.12% must be considered. The performance indicator 
with value 1.46% (Hα0) includes only rejects with the effect numbers being studied (parts missing or wrong 
parts assembled). The performance indicator with value 2.77% (Hβ0) includes Hα0 and rejects that have a non- 
assembly related attribute. The performance indicator with value 3.12% (Hγ0) includes rejects from Hα0 and 
Hβ0 as well as rejects connected to a series of categories that indicate leakage of oil and water. Parts missing or 
wrong parts assembled can, if not found earlier, lead to a leakage in the final test zone. If this happens the 
reject registration will not be in the category "parts missing" or "wrong parts assembled" and it will be 
"leakage" or "deviation from specification". Figure 3 shows the error distribution over the stations within the 
line during the nine month period before the pilot study. The workstations affected were stations 800 and 
1100, and as there are parallel lines this makes a total of four workstations. 
 
Fig. 2.   Performance indicator sorted per week 
 
Fig. 3.   Performance indicators sorted per assembly station. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
2.4 Assembly Process AS-IS 
 
The line studied contains twenty-four assembly stations and is  balanced  so  that  every  station  has 
approximately eight minutes of assembly time, i.e. the assembly  personnel  have eight  minutes to accomplish  
the assembly task. The work process starts typically with an AGV/carrier arriving at an assembly station. The 
onboard information system would typically be displaying up to 19 lines of text to describe the assembly 
requirements. The subsequent steps in the assembly process are (1) identification of part to assemble. (not 
necessary where parts are identical on all engines), (2) retrieval of part to assemble (3) assembly of part onto 
engine . Steps 1 to 3 are repeated until all parts are assembled. (4) Confirmation of task - the personnel confirm  
via an IT system that they have completed all assigned tasks at the station.  (5)  Carrier  departs  from  the 
assembly station to the next station. Step 1, "Identification", involves gathering of data/information. The 
data/information is presented to the personnel via a computer screen and is  visible  when  the AGV/carrier 
arrives at that assembly station. 
 
 
2.5 Assembly Process TO-BE (During the  Pilot) 
 
The TO-BE process is in a sense the same as the AS-IS process except in one important respect - that is the 
trigger. The trigger is a predecessor to "l. Identification of parts. .... ". No special arrangements influencing the 
production context were made, except for the handling of the triggers (the magnetic sheeting). This is to satisfy 
the objective of testing the hypotheses in a real assembly environment, and not in a controlled laboratory. 
MINITAB 14 was used to calculate the sample size (number of engine assemblies to be studied). And was 
calculated to be 2541. This, 2541, is approximately two weeks  (ten  twenty-four  days)  production.  Therefore 
the experimental time frame within the production area was set to ten days. It was expected  that  this  time  
frame would need updating during the experiment due for example to disturbances in production. In all 
experiments there is a possibility that the experiment itself influences the results. In this pilot three (four) 
experiment groups were used with the purpose to create an understanding of how this particular pilot might 
influence the personnel and thereby the results. The different experiment groups are divided by two different 
variables:  A:  Interaction: (Al :"High" , A2:"Low"),  B: Trigger: (BI:Present or  B2:Absent). 
 
 
3.0       Results 
 
The results can be categorized according to the subject groups. Control group A2B2: The results from this  
group are the historic data from the nine month  period  in 2006. This results are  used as a reference  value for  
the experiment groups. Experiment group AlBl: High interaction and trigger present. The experimenter was 
actively involved (asking questions, starting discussions about the work etc.) with the assembly  personnel at  
their work stations and the new trigger was present. Experiment group A1B2: High interaction and trigger 
absent. As before the experimenter was actively involved  with the assembly  personnel  at their  work stations 
but the new trigger was not used Experiment group A2Bl: Low interaction and trigger present. The 
experimenter was situated in the start of the assembly  line and  there was no or very little interaction  between  
the experimenter and the assembly personal. The single line was studied for a period of ten days during which 
2600 engines were assembled. At four (out of twenty-four) of the assembly stations the existing information 
system  was changed  to reduce  the amount  of  information  to be assimilated  by  the  workers, the timing of its 
  
 
presentation and its location. The use of simple colour-coded cards and symbols resulted in the 
reduction of internal rejects by 40% on two of the assembly stations and to zero on the other two 
stations. On reversion to the original information system the rate of internal rejects rose to equal or 
surpass those before the study. Full details of the results can be found in [16]. 
 
4.0 Conclusions 
 
 
It is believed that changing the information system changed the workers' behaviour through a reduction 
in cognitive stress levels. The pilot study has provided useful insights into the basis for modifying 
information systems and a further study of the final assembly of heavy trucks is planned with an 
ultimate aim of determining a rationale for the design of information systems for use within the 
assembly of customised products. The company expects to benefit in the long term through reduced 
rates of internal rejects brought about by more appropriate information systems that more closely 
match the assemblers ' needs for information. 
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